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Covariance Manipulation for Conjunction Assessment 
M.D. Hejduk1  
Astrorum Consulting LLC  Woodway, TX   76712 USA 
The manipulation of space object covariances to try to provide additional or improved 
information to conjunction risk assessment is not an uncommon practice.  Types of 
manipulation include fabricating a covariance when it is missing or unreliable to force the 
probability of collision (Pc) to a maximum value (“PcMax”), scaling a covariance to try to 
improve its realism or see the effect of covariance volatility on the calculated Pc, and 
constructing the equivalent of an epoch covariance at a convenient future point in the event 
(“covariance forecasting”).  In bringing these methods to bear for Conjunction Assessment 
(CA) operations, however, some do not remain fully consistent with best practices for 
conducting risk management, some seem to be of relatively low utility, and some require 
additional information before they can contribute fully to risk analysis.  This study describes 
some basic principles of modern risk management (following the Kaplan construct) and then 
examines the PcMax and covariance forecasting paradigms for alignment with these 
principles; it then further examines the expected utility of these methods in the modern CA 
framework.  Both paradigms are found to be not without utility, but only in situations that 
are somewhat carefully circumscribed. 
Nomenclature 
CA = Conjunction assessment 
CDF = Cumulative distribution function 
OCM = Conjunction data message 
GP = General perturbations 
HBR = Hard body radius 
OD = Orbit determination 
Pc = Probability of collision 
PcMax = Maximum probability of collision 
SP = Special perturbations 
TCA = Time of closest approach 
I. Introduction 
ATELLITE conjunction risk analysis relies heavily on the calculated Probability of Collision (Pc) between two 
space objects.  To assess the risk of any event involves determining the likelihood of its occurrence, and the only 
practicable way to represent an event’s likelihood is through a probability.  This heavily reliance on the Pc emerged 
from the experience of trying to assess collision risk with satellite miss distances alone.  Since satellite position 
uncertainty information is not present in miss-distance point estimates, it is extremely difficult to determine if a 
particular miss distance estimate is significant; likelihood estimates based on this parameter alone have thus been 
seen as not sufficient to enable collision risk analysis, directing the industry’s attention to the Pc.  Because the orbit 
determination (OD) covariance matrices for both the primary and secondary objects are necessary to calculate the 
Pc, a substantial interest has developed in securing and ensuring the propriety of these covariances. 
 The importance of the OD covariance to the conjunction assessment (CA) community has further spurred the 
development of methodologies to manipulate it in order to attempt to improve risk assessment.  Such approaches are 
generally of two types, and the first of these is to try to compensate for known or suspected deficiencies in the 
covariance.  Formulae have been developed to determine the maximum Pc possible when one or both of the objects’ 
covariances are missing or so poor as to be rendered completely invalid.  Such is the case, for example, when one is 
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attempting CA with the published two-line general perturbations (GP) element catalogue, which lacks covariance 
information; or an owner-operator-generated ephemeris that does not include covariance.  In these situations, this 
maximum value, called PcMax, provides an upper-bound Pc for the present conjunction and thus could allow a 
worst-case risk assessment and potentially enable remedial action.  Alternatively, compensatory covariance 
manipulation could be performed by recognizing that there is a certain inherent error or uncertainty in covariance 
formation and exploring whether (relatively) minor changes to the covariance size and/or aspect ratio could have a 
notably deleterious effect on the Pc.  This can be done through what is called “k-scaling,” in which the combined 
covariance in the conjunction plane is multiplied by a set of scale factors and the maximum Pc determined, or by 
scaling the primary and secondary covariances separately through nested application of laddered scale factors.  
Rather than seeking an overall maximum, such approaches are formulated to remain within a bounded set of scale 
factors that it is believed represent the uncertainty range of the covariances. 
 A second purpose for which covariances are altered is to try to forecast the size and orientation of a satellite’s 
epoch covariance at some future time.  This activity is different in kind from the usual propagation of covariance 
into the future.  After a conjunction between two satellites has been identified through a conjunction screening 
process, it is routine to propagate the two satellites’ states and covariances forward to the objects’ time of closest 
approach (TCA) and then calculate the Pc from this set of propagated states and covariances.  The covariance-
altering prognostication technique, sometimes called Pc Forecasting, is to attempt to construct an expected epoch 
covariance at some future point (by attempting to predict the amounts, sources, and times of satellite tracking that 
will be received between the present time and this future point, which are the main input to covariance formation) 
and then propagate that covariance forward to TCA and calculate the Pc.  It can be used as an attempt to predict the 
risk assessment situation as it might occur at a critical decision point (such as two days before TCA, a common 
maneuver commitment point) as a way of guessing at the criticality of the situation when it will most matter.  Some 
practitioners even try to prognosticate the epoch covariance at TCA to produce a quasi-definitive risk statement. 
 Both of these covariance manipulation approaches will be examined in the present analysis, with an eye to 
determining their appropriate utility given the modern practice of CA conducted with a precision catalogue.  The 
treatment will begin with a philosophical examination of risk analysis and the standard framework that has emerged 
over the last few decades for performing risk analysis reliably.  After this, the two different covariance manipulation 
types will be examined individually.  Pc maximization and covariance scaling will be given both a conceptual and 
quantitative treatment.  Covariance forecasting will be given a conceptual and numerical treatment by proxy; while 
this will not serve as a full evaluation, it will allow certain conclusions to be drawn.  A planned second part to this 
paper will address covariance scaling activities and give a full quantitative treatment of covariance forecasting. 
II. Risk Analysis Overview 
 There is certainly a large number of different risk management methodologies in use presently in industry, and 
these span from extremely loose, heuristic structured thinking models to extremely rigorous quantitative methods.  
Most of these quantitative methods, however, draw their foundational principles from the 1981 seminal article of 
Kaplan and Garrick1.  There are two major, framework-establishing concepts outlined in Kaplan’s treatment, one of 
which is reasonably commonly known and a second that is less frequently encountered; both of these will be 
discussed here in the context of CA. 
 The first of these concepts is what has come to be known as the “Kaplan Triplet.”  In trying to understand the 
risk posture for a certain enterprise, all of the possible outcome scenarios (S) are enumerated.  Each one of these 
scenarios has some certain likelihood or probability of taking place (P) and some particular consequence (X) should 
it take place.  The enumeration of these items for n scenarios thus produces a set of “triplets” as shown below: 
 
 < S1, P1, X1 > 
 < S2, P2, X2 > 
   … 
 < Sn, Pn, Xn > 
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If for all of these triplets the P and X points are plotted on a two-
dimensional Cartesian grid (usually with Consequence (X) on 
the x-axis and Probability (P) on the y-axis, the generated curve 
is called a “risk curve,” an example of which (from the Kaplan 
paper) is given in Fig. 1. 
One can see the implications of formulating risk this way:  
risk is defined as the interplay between the likelihood of 
unfavorable events and the consequence of such events should 
they happen.  Some practitioners go further and define risk not 
just as the relationship but as the product of likelihood and 
consequence; such an arrangement can be suitable for many 
situations, but it flows from a risk-neutral posture that is willing 
to accept essentially any consequence level, whereas some 
consequences may be judged to be so high that they push the 
risk much higher than the simple product would dictate.2   
 In conjunction risk analysis, the move to the use of Pc rather 
than miss distance has brought the discipline more into 
conformity with this paradigm by articulating, or at least 
attempting to articulate, the actual likelihood of a collision.  
However, the accompanying part—consequence—has been 
addressed hardly at all; most approaches consider all potential collisions to be the same in terms of consequence, 
regardless of whether the satellite could potentially survive the collision, the amount of debris that a collision could 
be expected to generate, and the orbit corridors that would be polluted with this debris, both shortly after generation 
and well into the future.  The set of Kaplan triplets really becomes just a single triplet, with “collision” as the single 
consequence and the calculated Pc the likelihood.  There is clearly room for an expanded construct here that 
considers the consequence aspect of each potential collision 
scenario, but the important point for the present discussion is 
that a true likelihood assessment is a constitutive element of 
each Kaplan Triplet.  The Pc, when properly formulated, 
provides the estimate of likelihood. 
 The second foundational concept in Kaplan’s framework is 
the understanding that any given Kaplan Triplet is only one 
instantiation of an estimate of the likelihood and consequence of 
a particular scenario.  The inputs to the Pc calculation 
(covariances and hard-body radius) have uncertainties associated 
with them; so when a single Pc value is generated, this point 
estimate is just one instantiation of an entire probability density 
of Pc values.  Estimates of collision consequence, should they be 
attempted, present the same situation:  one would expect a 
probability density of consequences rather than a single 
estimate.  Kaplan represents these probability densities as a 
series of contours, each with some likelihood of instantiation; 
his graph is reproduced here as Fig. 2. 
 CA risk assessment has in general not incorporated such a 
view in its operational analysis methods.  A single Pc value is 
calculated and used as the full representation of likelihood; and given that a static understanding of consequence is 
applied to every conjunction, there is certainly no effort expended to determine the uncertainty of that consequence 
actually arising should a collision occur.  The NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Anlaysis (CARA) team has 
begun a formal incorporation of input parameter uncertainty into its Pc calculations, thus producing probability 
densities of Pc for each conjunction rather than a single value3; other practitioners are pursuing this type of 
capability as well.  The important point here, however, is that statements of likelihood and consequence themselves 
have uncertainties and that these uncertainties need to be considered in formulating robust risk curves. 
 In evaluating different CA covariance manipulation methods, one must examine in what manner and to what 
degree they improve CA risk analysis.  These two key foundational concepts from Kaplan are proposed here as a 
framework for making this evaluation.  While it is certainly possible to lend aid to the risk analysis enterprise in a 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Kaplan likelihood vs consequence 
risk curve.  Likelihood is given on the y-axis and 
consequence on the x-axis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Kaplan risk probability density. 
Contours are lines of constant probability. 
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manner not directly addressed by these two concepts, proposed improvements that are at variance with or fail 
structurally to make room for them will in all likelihood detract from rather than enhance CA operations. 
III. Absolute and Relative Pc Maxima 
 The two-dimensional Pc calculation, in which the short conjunction duration allows the assumptions of 
rectilinear motion and a static covariance in the vicinity of the encounter and thus the reduction of the 
dimensionality of the problem from three to two, is the standard technique used by most CA risk assessment 
toolsets.  The full details of the calculation are 
thoroughly explained in Chan (2008),4 but the 
conjunction geometry is usually visualized in the 
conjunction plane (plane normal to the relative velocity 
vector), and the Pc is the portion of the combined 
position uncertainty density that falls within the objects’ 
combined hard-body radius (HBR) area, as shown in 
Fig. 3. 
 Some years ago, when general perturbations (GP) 
element sets, which lacked a covariance, were the only 
available set of state estimates for conjunction 
secondary objects, it was recognized that the full 
possible range of sizes, aspect ratios, and orientations of 
the combined covariance in the conjunction plane could 
be explored to find the particular arrangement of these 
three attributes that produced a maximum Pc value.  
This concept appears to have first entered the literature 
in Alfriend et al. (1999),5 who recommended it for 
situations in which the reliability of the two objects’ covarainces was suspect.  The approach was studied thoroughly 
and methodically by Alfano (2005),6 who developed a number of useful approximations for calculating the 
maximum Pc (hereafter abbreviated “PcMax”).  He provides several different approximations for PcMax when the 
combined covariance aspect ratio is known or can be reasonably guessed, and he evaluates these approximations’ 
accuracy for aspect ratios from 1 to 50.  He subsequently provides a derived formula and simplifying approximation 
for cases in which the aspect ratio can be considered essentially infinite (> 1000)—the maximum Pc is reached when 
this degenerate ellipse lies along the relative miss vector in the conjunction plane.  Frisbee expanded this latter 
concept to consider the case in which one of the two conjuncting object’s covariances is known but the other is not.7  
A procedure similar to Alfano’s is applied to the object without covariance, but the combination with the known 
covariance pulls uncertainty density away from the degeneracy along the miss vector and thus lowers the maximum 
Pc value.  In some circumstances, this tempered maximum may be significantly smaller than that for the 
unencumbered PcMax. 
 Neither of the researchers cited above believed that the calculated PcMax, in either the constrained or 
unconstrained form, was a substitute for an actual calculated Pc; and in their work they both are quite careful to 
articulate limitations for the use of this construct.  While very much endorsing their statements of limitations, the 
present author believes the actual utility of PcMax calculations may be even more constrained.  The following 
commentary is an attempt to examine the many different ways in which the PcMax construct can be misused. 
A. PcMax is not a Probability of Collision in the True Sense 
A “regular” Pc represents the likelihood that two space objects, given their state uncertainties, will pass each 
other with a distance less than the combined hard-body radius.  The PcMax construct, in contrast, postulates a set of 
conditions on the objects’ covariances that will push this calculated Pc value to a maximum.  What it does not do, 
however, is provide an adjoining statement of the likelihood that those particular conditions will in fact arise.  
Because it is merely a maximum without any sense of the likelihood of this maximum’s actually occurring, it does 
not represent the probability of a particular risk scenario—it cannot be used in the context of a Kaplan Triplet.  To 
make PcMax into a probability that perhaps could be used in this way, it would need to be combined with a 
calculation of the likelihood of its occurrence.  Given that the PcMax construct is being pursued in the first place 
because of significantly reduced knowledge about the conjunction situation, it is extremely unlikely that one could 
calculate a reasonable likelihood of occurrence of the antecedent conditions that make PcMax possible.  The PcMax 
does of course describe a scenario in which a particular type of consequence—the highest Pc possible— is realized; 
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Figure 3. Pc calculation elements projected into 
conjunction plane.  
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but because the likelihood of this scenario’s arising is unknown, this information does not have a role in a risk 
analysis context. 
B. PcMax is not Practically Useful as a Screening Parameter for the Present 
 While there have been only occasional attempts to deploy PcMax as an actual risk assessment metric, its use as a 
conjunction screening threshold has been much more common.  While it cannot give the actual risk of a conjunction, 
as its name implies it does give the maximum Pc that could be obtained for the particular conjunction; so if the 
PcMax value is below one’s screening threshold for 
conjunctions of interest, one can safely ignore this 
particular conjunction for the present (whether it can 
safely be ignored for the future is treated in the next 
section).  As an abstract principle this statement is 
certainly cogent; what remains to be established is 
whether PcMax, in either its unconstrained or 
constrained form, is useful practically as a 
conjunction screening filter. 
 To examine this question, a subset of the CARA 
Orbital Conjunction Message (OCM) database was 
selected for analysis.  An OCM is generated 
whenever, as part of a conjunction screening activity 
that extends some number of days into the future, a 
catalogued object penetrates a screening volume 
ellipsoid centered on a protected primary asset.  
OCMs were collected for eleven of the satellites that 
CARA protects (all taken from a near-circular 
~700km orbit, which is the orbit band that tends to 
generate the most conjunctions) for a one-year period 
(May 2015 to May 2016)—a dataset of approximately 72,000 OCMs.  One useful way to organize such data is by 
the severity of the calculated Pc, and a “green-yellow-red” color scheme is used operationally for such 
categorization.  Green events are those with a Pc so low that the event does not merit further examination; such 
events have Pc values that range from 0 to 1E-07.  Yellow events are those that, while not meriting remediation at 
present, have the propensity to become serious; the 
range of Pc values for this category is 1E-07 to 
around 1E-04.  Red events are those that are 
considered serious and in some instances will merit 
remediation; such events have a Pc greater than 4E-04 
(according to current CARA practice).  In order to 
make the present analysis somewhat more ecumenical 
and embrace round numbers, for the purposes of this 
analysis “red” events are those with a Pc greater than 
1E-04.  For the dataset under investigation, about 
60,000 OCMs were categorized as green, 9000 as 
yellow, and 2000 as red, corresponding to 
percentages of 85%, 12.2%, and 2.8%, respectively. 
 The screening volume used for this particular 
orbit regime is an ellipsoid centered on the protected 
primary with semi-major axes of 0.5 km in the radial 
direction, 17 km in the in-track direction, and 20 km 
in the cross-track direction.  Screening volume sizes 
are set based on desired capture percentages and 
processing limitations, but this volume size has been 
used for some years with satisfactory results.  A 
volume of this size will, of course, restrict the range of conjunction miss distances observed, but miss vectors of 
some consequence are still encountered.  A cumulative distribution function (CDF) plot of the miss distances for the 
conjunction dataset, organized by color, is given in Fig. 4.  While the miss distances for the red OCMs are, as 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Miss distance CDFs for analysis dataset, 
separated by color.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Maximum Pc as a function of miss distance.  
Presumes a constant HBR of 20m. 
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expected, notably smaller than those for yellow and green OCMs, the median miss distances for both yellow and 
green are close to 10km and therefore not by any means small.   
Alfano’s formula for PcMax is given in Equation 
34 of his 2005 paper, for which he then gives a very 
good linearized approximation in Equations 35 and 
36; over the miss distances in play for the present 
analyses, the two expressions produce results that are 
are essentially indistinguishable.  Both formulae 
render PcMax as a function of the ratio of the HBR to 
the miss distance; but by choosing to operate at a 
fixed HBR of 20m (the value used by CARA for 
most of its protected assets), the expressions become 
a function of miss distance alone; and this linear 
relationship (in log-space) is shown in Fig. 5.  One 
can see immediately that, for routine levels of the red 
threshold, only conjunctions with extremely large 
miss distances—much larger than any miss distances 
permitted by the screening volume used for the 
present dataset—will produce PcMax values smaller 
than the nominal red Pc threshold of 1E-04.  The 
actual distributions of PcMax values for the present 
dataset, given as CDF plots, are provided in Fig. 6.  
Even the more restrictive CARA red threshold of 4E-
04 would produce essentially no screening exclusions 
by using the PcMax formulation.  Larger screening volumes are, of course, used for certain orbit regimes, and for 
these a PcMax-based pre-screening activity could perhaps identify more candidates for elimination.  However, 
screenings in these orbit regimes also tend to identify far fewer conjunctions; so the absolute benefit of this pre-
screening in such situations would be relatively small, especially given the ease of calculation of the 2-D Pc. 
 Alfano also developed a more bounded 
methodology for the maximum Pc calculation for 
those cases in which the aspect ratio of the combined 
covariance projected into the conjunction plane is 
known or could be reasonably guessed.  He further 
profiled a series of GP-based CA screenings for which 
he approximated the covariances based on a GP error 
growth evaluation and formulated histograms that 
could be used to make informed choices of possible 
aspect ratio values.  A similar profiling was conducted 
for the aspect ratios of the combined covariances for 
the current dataset, and the results are given in Fig. 7.  
Alfano’s profiling showed 99% of conjunctions to 
have an aspect ratio of 40 or less and 99.9% a value of 
70 or less, with 140 as essentially an upper bound.  
The current dataset, for which the black line 
represents all conjunctions, gives a very different set 
of results:  a median aspect ratio of about 20, a 90th 
percentile of about 130, a 95th percentile of 
approximately 250, and an absolute maximum that 
exceeds 12,000.  It is clear that the characteristics of a 
2015-16 precision catalogue, which includes the 
results of two large debris-producing events, are very 
different from those arising from his GP-based investigations with a 2005 catalogue.  The increased dynamic range 
of the projected combined covariance aspect ratio present in the special perturbations (SP) catalogue makes it much 
more difficult to use a technique that requires an a priori guess at this value.  Given the information vacuum that 
would drive the user to use a PcMax calculation approach in the first place, and given the increased difficulty in 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Unconstrained maximum Pc CDFs for 
analysis dataset, separated by color. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Conjunction plane covariance ellipse aspect 
ratio CDFs for analysis dataset, separated by color.  
Black line shows results for all data. 
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choosing a representative aspect ratio in the SP situation, it is unlikely that one could justify using a technique that 
requires an assumption of the aspect ratio value over the PcMax technique, which does not require this. 
 The more bounded PcMax technique developed by Frisbee—which addresses the case in which one of the 
object’s covariances is known but the other is not—
would seem to hold more promise as a screening 
threshold, as one should expect the Pc values to be 
not as large and therefore perhaps smaller than a 
typical “red” threshold.  Figure 8 gives CDF results 
for the Frisbee technique against the analysis set of 
OCMs; the solid lines represent cases in which the 
covariance of the secondary object is presumed to be 
unknown and the dashed lines those cases in which 
the primary covariance is presumed unknown.  The 
former situation (secondary covariances unknown) 
would be encountered by a satellite owner who 
posssesses a precision ephemeris and covariance for 
his own satellite but is perhaps performing CA 
against a GP catalogue of secondaries, which lacks a 
covariance.  As can be seen in the figure, screening 
against a red threshold of 1E-04 would produce 
essentially no eliminations, and a more aggressive 
figure of 5E-04 would result in elimination of about 
20% of the cases.  Perhaps this amount of elimination 
would be seen as somewhat helpful; but given that 
this testset produced about 200 OCMs per day, 
eliminating 40 still leaves 160 to process—a large enough number that methods for investigating large numbers of 
potentially serious conjunctions will still be needed.  The situation in which the primary covariance is unknown, 
which can arise when using owner/operator ephemerides (that sometimes lack a covariance) to screen against a 
precision catalogue of secondaries that contains covariances, is represented by the dashed lines in Fig. 8.  Here one 
can see that the situation is more sanguine; against a red threshold of 1E-04, about 20% of the green OCMs can be 
eliminated and over 60% of the yellow OCMs.  The use of the higher 5E-04 threshold eliminates over 50% of the 
red and green OCMs and 90% of the yellow OCMs.  Such numbers document a real utility for the technique.  
However, if the screening agency has access to an entire space catalogue with reliable covariance data, then 
presumably it also has access to the catalogue entry—with covariance—for the primary object.  Simply using this 
covariance along with the owner/operator ephemeris, while introducing perhaps some theory incompatibility, would 
still be a much better estimate of the primary object’s covariance than presuming that nothing at all is known and 
employing a PcMax technique.  If there is concern about theory incompatibility, one could respond by making the 
screening threshold somewhat lower to compensate. 
C. PcMax is not Practically Useful as a Screening Parameter for the Future 
  There is virtue in being able to dismiss an event for the present because the PcMax falls below the chosen 
threshold for considering a conjunction to be worrisome and therefore worth pursuing further.  There is much 
greater virtue, however, in being able to dismiss the event for the rest of its multi-day history based on a PcMax 
calculation from a single OCM.  If one could reasonably conclude from a single report that the event had no 
reasonable chance of ever becoming serious, this would eliminate the need for any further consideration or 
calculations for this event, even if it continued to appear in screenings. 
 In order for such decisive dismissals to be possible on the basis of a single OCM, the miss distance between the 
two objects at TCA must remain relatively constant from update to update.  After all, the unconstrained PcMax 
formula is driven only by miss distance (actually, by the ratio of the HBR to the miss distance, but with a fixed HBR 
it is the same thing), so an enduring miss-distance estimate would give similar endurance to the PcMax formula’s 
results.  Frisbee’s constrained PcMax formulae are more problematic candidates for enduring estimates; for 
essentially invariant enduring estimates for miss distance and covariance would be required, and propagated 
covariances are expected to be smaller in size with shorter propagation intervals.  But to enable either case, a miss 
distance estimate that can be expected to change rather little over the remaining event history is necessary. 
 If a PcMax approach is being pursued because of questions regarding the propriety of the covariance, it could be 
further wondered whether the same issues that affect the realism of the covariance similarly affect the quality of the 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Constrained maximum Pc CDFs for analysis 
dataset, separated by color. 
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state estimate and therefore the calculated miss distance, at least to enough of a degree to challenge the expectation 
of a fairly constant miss distance.  In any case, Fig. 9 provides data on the change in relative miss distance as 
conjunction events develop.  For each event (of which there were ~7300 in the dataset under analysis), the miss 
distance at two days to TCA was used as the standard against which changes were measured; this point was chosen 
as a typical maneuver-commit time and therefore the point at which conjunction analysis would essentially cease.  
The set of CDFs in the left graph summarizes the situation for green events and the set on the right for red events.  
For this chart, the color definitions are modified slightly:  an OCM is assigned a color based on the highest Pc that 
the event achieved during its history; for example, an OCM with a Pc of 1E-10 would be given red status if at some 
point in the event history an OCM were received with a Pc greater than 1E-04.  Each CDF line describes the set of 
miss distance changes over a certain number of days; for example, the blue lines summarize miss-distance changes 
from 7 days to 2 days to TCA.  One can see that, even in some cases over short periods, there is a non-discountable 
number of rather large changes in miss distance, especially given that the screening volume itself (0.5km x 17 x 20) 
will allow a maximum miss distance of only ~26km, with observed values (from Fig. 4) tailing off at about 22km.  
Twenty-five percent of green cases change by more than 1km from 4 to 2 days, and 10% of red events change by 
more than 10km from 5 to 2 days.  While these are not large percentages of the dataset, the fact that one out of ten 
red events experiences such a large miss-distance change is nonetheless a sufficiently large frequency to prevent the 
PcMax calculation to be used as an event dismissal criterion—such changes can impose too large a volatility on the 
Pc for the miss distances obtained using a screening volume of the present size. 
 It must be emphasized that the present study finds no theoretical problem at all with the PcMax formulae 
developed by Alfano and Frisbee; they quite correctly produce the envisioned outcomes, and the CA industry has 
been done a notable service by their development.  Given the current available data products and CA practices, 
however, the added value of these approximations as screening filters appears to be much lower than was or would 
be encountered in a GP environment.   
IV. “Forecasting” Epoch Covariances 
A. Definitions and Basic Theory 
 The previous section has discussed manipulating the combined covariance in order to compensate for either a 
direct or selective absence of actual covariances for primary and secondary objects.  In this section, a very different 
type of manipulation will be addressed:  the attempted construction of a future epoch covariance in an attempt to 
 
 
 
Figure 9. CDF plot of change in miss distance, by time to TCA.  Green and red events are plotted separately. 
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give better-contexted risk assessment information.  Because the concept and techniques are somewhat more 
complicated, in order to allow clearer explanations it is important to establish some terminology. 
 An orbit determination (OD) activity produces a state estimate of a satellite at a particular point in time, and this 
time point is called the epoch time.  There are conventions for setting OD epoch times, but the epoch can in fact be 
at any time chosen for convenience.  The OD process also produces an epoch covariance, which represents the 
estimation uncertainty at this epoch time.  If the covariance at some future time is desired, the epoch covariance is 
propagated forward in time; there are a number of different methods for doing this, ranging from a simple linearized 
propagation to a full Monte Carlo approach.  This forward propagation of covariance (usually through simple 
linearized means) is a common practice in CA:  a screening exercise finds a conjunction expected to take place 
several days in the future, so the objects’ states and covariances are propagated forward to TCA and the Pc 
calculated.  Therefore the typical situation is to perform a risk analysis some number of days before TCA, with the 
objects’ states and covariances propagated to TCA—the objects’ epoch times are some amount of time in the past, 
prior to the time the risk assessment is being performed, and the propagation interval for each runs from their epoch 
times to TCA. 
 Covariance Forecasting also attempts to construct a future covariance but pursues it in a different way; its 
objective is to try to determine what an object’s epoch covariance will be at some future point.  To understand how 
this is possible, it is necessary to understand how the batch estimation technique used at the JSpOC conducts 
covariance formation.  Except in those relatively unusual instances where initial orbit determination is required, OD 
at the JSpOC consists of using sensor observations taken on the object to differentially correct the orbit in order to 
minimize the observation residuals.  The minimization equation and variable definitions are given below: 
 
 WbAWAAdx TT 1)(   (1) 
 
 dx is the vector of corrections to the state estimate 
 A is the so-called “normal” matrix of partial derivatives, and it consists of two conceptual parts.  The first is a 
set of partial derivatives to map changes in observation space to changes in state space, and the second is to 
map state changes at a particular time to state changes at the chosen epoch time.  A matrix of partial 
derivatives for each of these two transformations is developed (the observation-to-state space matrix is 
usually called the H-matrix and the time-modification matrix called the state transition matrix), and the 
product of these produces the A-matrix. 
 W is the matrix of relative weights of the observables from different sensors.  It is acknowledged that 
different sensors take observations with different levels of accuracies.  Typically the weighting factors are the 
reciprocals of the variances of a sensor’s expected errors in each observable, determined by a sensor 
calibration process. 
 b is the vector of observation residuals against the trajectory given by the previous state estimate.  
 
The term (ATWA)-1 is the covariance matrix; it gives the expected variances in each of the state variables and the 
covariances of these variables with each other. 
 Given this covariance production mechanism, it is important to note what information is and is not required in 
order to construct the covariance matrix.  To determine observation-space-to-state-space partial derivatives, time 
transformations from observation time to epoch time, and relative weighting of observables, all that is required is to 
know the amount of expected tracking, the reporting sensor for each track, and the time at which the track is taken.  
Even though the covariance gives an estimate of the error in the state estimate produced by the OD, it is not a 
summary of the actual residual errors; rather, it is an a priori estimate of what those errors are expected to be given 
the amount of tracking, the sensors that produced it, and the times at which the tracks were taken.  There is 
sometimes some disappointment about the more abstract nature of this covariance, but the corresponding advantage 
is that it can be constructed in the absence of actual tracking data.  If one believes that it is possible to make durable 
predictions of the tracking that an object will receive and the times and sources of this tracking, then the covariance 
matrix can be assembled and even used based on these predictions only. 
 While the approach described above is the most rigorous for constructing a covariance (as it is the method 
actually used in the OD process), there are more simplified alternatives.  One could presume that, most of the time, 
the epoch covariance for any given object is more or less the same; so one could simply take an epoch covariance 
from the past and deploy it as a proxy for a future epoch covariance.  A second approach could be to characterize the 
“shrinkage” in the covariance propagated to TCA as one moves from solutions from 7 to 6 to 5 days to TCA and 
extrapolate from this trend what the propagated-to-TCA covariance will look like at, say, a decision point two days 
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to TCA.  These simplified methods assume that the tracking levels, sources, and relative times are similar enough 
that such proxies or trends are durable and predictive with relatively small errors; this issue will be addressed in 
more depth in a subsequent section. 
B. Forecasting Covariances to TCA 
 The above outlines how one may go about generating a future epoch covariance (or, using simplifying methods, 
a propagated-to-TCA covariance from a different temporal starting point) without the possession of actual tracking 
data.  Given that this is possible, what should one do with this capability?  One possibility that comes to mind 
immediately is to forecast the primary and secondary covariances to TCA.  This certainly seems prima facie to be a 
reasonable application:  propagating the covariance to TCA increases the covariance size because of the growing 
effects of state estimate uncertainties once projected into the future, so avoiding the need to propagate by forecasting 
the epoch covariance at TCA should give the most reasonable and bounded estimate of the covariance and thus yield 
a better risk assessment result.   
 While this approach is at many levels attractive, it encounters some philosophical difficulties that leave the 
forecasting of the epoch covariance to TCA a problematic concept.  The issues are best explained by stepping 
through the different possibilities of the temporal placement of the epoch covariance, either real or projected, in the 
typical life cycle of a conjunction event.   
 Conjunction risk analysis is performed by taking information actually in possession of the evaluators and 
projecting it into the future to illuminate the circumstances of the expected future conjunction.  State estimates and 
covariances for the primary and secondary object, which have an epoch time some period of time in the recent past, 
are propagated forward to TCA; and the Pc is calculated, along with other information of interest such as collision 
approach angle, combined covariance orientation in the conjunction plane, etc.  Quantified uncertainty in the 
satellites’ state estimates is captured in the epoch covariances, and these uncertainties grow as they are propagated 
forward to TCA, often presenting the analyst with more uncertainty about the situation than he or she would like.  
But everything that is calculated about the conjunction at TCA is grounded in information that is actually known; 
while state estimates and covariances are propagated, they are based on OD results using real observations from real 
sensors. 
 One possible application of covariance forecasting is to prognosticate an epoch covariance at a future decision 
point.  For example, suppose a conjunction has been discovered through a screening activity and is 7 days from 
TCA.  A typical decision point for conjunction remediation is 2 days from TCA; this is close to the “maneuver 
commitment” point at which the maneuver commands are authorized and will be uploaded to the spacecraft, and it 
may not be possible to call off the maneuver past this point.  One could use covariance forecasting to try to construct 
an epoch covariance at the 2-days-from-TCA point; by propagating this forecasted 2-day epoch covariance to TCA, 
one can construct what the decision-maker is likely to be faced with when he or she actually has to render a 
remediation decision at the 2-day point.  The decision will not, of course, be made 7 days from TCA even if a 2-day 
covariance forecast has been executed and is in hand, but what can be done is to determine how the availability of 
other information might improve or erode the decision-maker’s trade-space at the 2-day point.  For example, one 
could construct several different epoch covariances for the 2-day point, each of which is assembled presuming 
different levels of sensor tracking, to determine whether an increase in tracking would substantially facilitate the 
remediation decision at the 2-day point.  Some conjunctions show substantial reduction in the Pc given additional 
tracking for one of the objects (usually by shrinking the size of the secondary object’s covariance); other 
conjunctions are relatively insensitive to tracking increases.  If, based on a forecast covariance, it appears that 
increased tracking could considerably improve or clarify the decision situation at the 2-day point, then one would 
have a reasonable justification for asking for increased sensor tasking on the object.  This covariance forecast 
approach provides a more rigorous method for determining to which conjunctions relatively scare sensor tracking 
resources should be allocated—it is superior to examining simply recent tracking levels or the epoch age of the OD, 
for there is no necessary connection between an object’s appearing to be in need of tracking and additional tracking 
actually aiding an associated conjunction remediation decision, and vice versa. 
 While one can indeed attempt to predict what the risk assessment parameters will look like at some future 
decision point (here by constructing epoch covariances at the 2-day-to-TCA point, propagating them to TCA, and 
calculating risk assessment parameters from these data), it is not proper to make the actual remediation decision 
days in advance of the 2-day point even with such information in hand.  First of all, the entire utility of the 
covariance forecasting enterprise rests upon the presumption that the conjunction geometry and miss distance will 
not change from the current estimate—only the covariances are prognosticated, not the actual states; so that part of 
the forecasting activity is taken from the 7-day propagation and left unaltered.  Subsequent tracking is likely to 
change the miss distance and geometry at least to some degree, and potentially quite significantly (as was shown 
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previously in Fig. 4); so it would be extremely ill-advised to render an actual remediation decision in the face of a 
presumption that in many cases does not inhere well at all.  Second, the actual amount of tracking may be quite 
different from what was predicted, including potentially the receipt of no new tracking at all.  This latter case throws 
the precariousness of the forecast covariance nicely into relief.  If no additional tracking is received between the 
discovery of the conjunction and first analysis (7 days to TCA) and the decision point (2 days to TCA), then the 
reasonable practice is to make the remediation decision at the 2-day point using the data that were in fact available at 
the 7-day point—these data represent the most recent information, stale though they may be.  It is difficult to 
contemplate at the 2-day point using instead results from a forecast epoch covariance for the 2-day point—
assembled five days previously—based on expected tracking that never in fact materialized.  The forecast 
covariance is useful as a direct decision aid only to the degree that its guesses at the expected tracking levels actually 
align with the observed tracking levels.  Otherwise, if a forecast epoch covariance analysis shows that more tracking 
would drive the risk below an action threshold, why even bother to ask for the additional tracking?  One could 
simply dismiss the event based on the forecast covariance, regardless of whether the sensors ever followed through 
with the requests.  A forecast covariance can reveal whether additional data would or would not be helpful, but it 
cannot serve as a substitute for the actual data.  If this were not true, why not postulate an infinite amount of 
extremely accurate data, which would drive the risk down to 0 every time, so long as the nominal miss distance is 
greater than the HBR, which it almost always is? 
 With this background discussion in place, it is time to address the forecasting of the epoch covariance to TCA.  
TCA, as the moment at which a collision will occur (in the hyperkinetic collision case at least, which appropriately 
describes most conjunctions), is not a remediation decision point; and no assembly of the decision aids as one 
believes they might appear at TCA would ever have the benefit of the “actual” data that these constructions suppose 
will be received.  So a decision based on anticipated constructions of the epoch covariances at TCA can never be a 
decision grounded in real data.   
This fact, in the end, renders the forecast covariance at TCA without any real risk assessment utility.  Forecasting 
covariances at TCA is presently performed by guessing at the amount of tracking that will be taken on the primary 
and secondary objects and constructing a pair of covariances from this information, in one of the manners described 
in the previous section.  However, because there is no intention to tie these predictions to the actual receipt of such 
tracking data, there is no reason to limit the hypothesized tracking to what the space surveillance network (SSN) is 
actually likely to do or, for that matter, even to remain within its present capabilities.  Once the point for actually 
making a decision (e.g., the 2-day point) has passed, why is it important anymore what subsequent tracking data are 
actually taken?  Tracking data after the decision point cannot change the assessment of the collision likelihood in 
any useful way—the decision has already been rendered, and such data were not available to participate in the 
decision.  Suppose that after the remediation decision point all of the SSN sensors devoted all of their tracking 
energy to both objects whenever they were in view, and in light of all of this tracking, the calculated Pc dropped 
substantially; while that is interesting information, it is not helpful because the decision point has already passed.  
Now suppose that fictitious sensors are added to the SSN and turned on right after the 2-day decision point, and they 
produce so much excellent tracking that the conjunction risk now drops essentially to zero.  Finally presume that no 
tracking is expected on the objects at all after the 2-day point and thus the Pc value calculated using the forecast 
covariances is exactly the same as the Pc at the 2-day point.  All four of these outcomes (regular tracking, high-
volume SSN tracking, fictitious almost infinite tracking, and no tracking) in this context render information that, at 
the time the remediation decision is to be made, cannot be verified or supported by actual tracking levels.  
Therefore, and this is the important point, there is in the end no substantive difference among any of these four 
options, even though some of them are pure fantasy.  The default position has been, of course, to try to guess what 
tracking the SSN would actually perform between the remediation decision point and TCA, but why is this 
inherently a more useful position to hold than, say, the absurd position of presuming that the SSN would between 
now and TCA dedicate itself entirely to tracking the two objects in question?  In both cases one is guessing at how 
the perception of the risk might change if that amount of tracking were obtained, but in neither case will any of the 
actual tracking data make it back to the decision-maker as actionable information.  The understanding of the 
likelihood of a collision is affected by the actual amount of information the decision-maker has at the decision point; 
it is not affected at all by the amount of fictional information that one hypothesizes could be taken after the 
remediation decision is made.  The statement “if the SSN tracks as it usually does, an OD were performed at TCA, 
and the conjunction miss distance and geometry do not change from right now until then, the Pc would be X” is no 
more or less useful than the statement “if we were to get an infinite amount of error-free tracking between now and 
TCA, an OD were performed at TCA, and the conjunction miss distance and geometry do not change from right 
now until then, the Pc would be 0.” 
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A different way to look at the situation is the following.  Seven days from TCA, a screening activity calculates a 
miss distance and a Pc, but there is not much certainty about the situation because the tracking is less than desirable 
and seven days of propagation to TCA is required.  Forecast covariances for the primary and secondary at TCA are 
assembled, presuming increased tracking (because increased sensor tasking would be requested).  A Pc is calculated 
from these forecast covariances (but the unchanged current miss distance), and the Pc is much lower because the 
covariances are better determined (more tracking) and no covariance propagation is required since they are 
determined for TCA.  One now brings this new Pc to the risk analysis activity and concluded that this event’s Pc is 
likely to decrease. 
Why is this same miss distance, which 7 days prior to TCA is very uncertain given the large covariances, 
suddenly very certain in the forecast at TCA when no new data have actually been brought to the evaluation?  Why 
would it be presumed that all of this hypothesized tracking would not result in a different miss distance?  If the 
situation is so uncertain when this (unchanged) miss distance is first calculated, should that not almost guarantee that 
the miss distance will be different should all of the hypothesized tracking actually get taken and incorporated into an 
OD?  Uncertain situations cannot be made more certain through the postulation and incorporation of fictitious data. 
C. Covariance Forecasting Uncertainties 
While there may be disagreement regarding the rectitude of using an epoch covariance forecast to TCA, there 
clearly are uses for covariances forecast to time-points up to and including the final decision point.  The question 
now becomes how one may go about determining these forecast epoch covariances and the amount of uncertainty 
latent in these methods. 
The NASA CARA project presently has an open task to create a large number of synthesized covariances as part 
of a study on the expected effects on the CA mission of the US Air Force’s S-Band Fence radar deployment; after 
the completion of that study, a large number of numerical examples will be available to help determine the ability to 
predict actual tracking levels and therefore the actual differences between hypothesized covariances and the real 
covariances that eventually were formed by the OD process at those same time points.  For the present, suffice it to 
offer some general comments on what must be done in order for a forecast covariance to be a reasonable contributor 
to an assessment of risk. 
The question of the best way to produce such a covariance appears to remain a problem without a definitive 
solution.  Duncan8 addresses it at only the highest level, stating that “Forecast covariance can come from time 
history files or propagated VCM covariances”; presumably the former refers to empirical studies that determine a 
canonical covariance growth history.  Vincent9 suggests that quadratic error growth curves could be used to “shrink” 
covariances appropriately but comments on the sensitivity of covariance formation and ultimately Pc to the 
observation history available for and used in the OD.  Cerven10 conducts his study within a GP framework and 
therefore turns to GP error growth curves to 
synthesize a covariance as appropriate.  None of 
these three practitioners appears to be attempting 
to construct covariances from the actual predicted 
tracking. 
A good reason for this hesitancy can perhaps 
be found in examining tracking level histories for 
secondary objects, as the secondaries tend to have 
the much larger covariances that thus dominate the 
Pc calculation.  The tracking histories for the 
~2100 secondaries involved in the ~7300 events in 
the present analysis dataset were obtained and 
analyzed.  The one-year span of this dataset was 
divided into one-day, two-day, three-day, etc. up 
to seven-day time windows, and the number of 
tracks each object received in each of those 
windows was tabulated; descriptive statistics were 
then generated by object for this dataset, with the 
goal of trying to determine the amount of 
variability in the tracking data.  The best statistic 
to represent this is the coefficient of variation, 
which is the quotient of the sample standard 
deviation and the sample mean of the dataset.  Figure 10 gives the results of this analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Coefficient of variation of secondary tracking 
(σ and μ for # of tracks received in given time span). 
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To be sure it is clear how the descriptive statistics were calculated, an example will be explained here in prose.  
The one-year period was divided up into five-day time windows.  The number of tracks that each secondary received 
in each five-day time window was tabulated and stored—73 (365/5) tracking counts for each object.  The mean and 
standard deviation of these 73 counts for each object was calculated, producing one standard deviation and mean per 
secondary object.  The quotient of these two values was taken to produce one coefficient of variation per secondary 
object.  A CDF curve of these coefficients of variation was then produced.  This procedure was repeated for the 
other time-bin sizes; and the results for all seven time-bin sizes are provided in Fig. 10. 
A coefficient of variation of unity means that the standard deviation and the mean value are the same, so the 1-
sigma span runs from zero to twice the mean value.  A distribution with these characteristics is unlikely to be 
Gaussian and is almost certainly right-skewed, so it does not make sense to apply Gaussian sigma percentiles to the 
situation; but what is clear is that the variation is quite large—the mean value is hardly a good proxy for the number 
of tracks that any given time window might contain.  Coefficients of variation of 0.5 and larger would in this context 
be at the beginnings of a large value, and the CDF plots indicate that for a seven-day prediction (the most stable of 
the seven bins), 30% of the secondaries exceed this value of 0.5.  Shorter predictions show even more volatility 
because there is less damping of smaller variations by the larger window size.  So for a significant number of the 
secondaries, it will be difficult to claim that the amount of expected tracking can be predicted merely on the basis of 
past tracking rates; the amount of variation in these rates is too large to make this a credible claim.  Furthermore, in 
order to construct the covariance, one must further specify the reporting sensors and the times of tracking; if it is 
difficult to anticipate simply the amount of expected tracking, it will be that much more difficult to predict the 
precise stations and times of such tracks. 
 This situation serves as an excellent illuminator of the second concept from Kaplan’s risk assessment framework 
described earlier:  estimates of likelihood contain uncertainty, and this uncertainty needs to be represented in the risk 
analysis trade-space.  If one wishes to try to forecast covariances—and useful situations for doing this have been 
outlined previously—it will be necessary to give some statement of the uncertainty associated with the forecast 
covariance.  The variation in tracking rates shows that tracking estimation errors are unlikely to be either negligible 
or static, so either an accompanying error function will need to be developed and flowed through the calculation or a 
Monte Carlo approach will need to be deployed that considers the actual likelihood of tracking by any given station 
during any given pass, considering tasking levels and previous tracking at that station.  Only such an explicit 
recognition of the uncertainties inherent in this difficult estimation process can enable an estimate of collision 
likelihood that is sufficiently nuanced to be useful in the risk analysis process.  
V. Conclusions and Future Work 
Foundational principles from the Kaplan risk analysis treatment are helpful in evaluating two different types of 
covariance manipulation approaches.  Maximum Pc calculation techniques do not produce an actual likelihood 
estimate and therefore cannot be included in a Kaplan Triplet as part of risk assessment.  They are legitimately 
deployed as screening thresholds, but with the high-precision SP catalogue and typical CA screening volumes they 
have only very limited utility.  Covariance forecasting techniques certainly do have a reasonable technical basis, but 
deploying them to forecast epoch covariances to TCA introduces philosophical difficulties that are not easy to 
resolve and, in the opinion of this author, ultimately leave them ill-suited for CA risk assessment.  The forecasting of 
covariances to actual future decision points avoids these philosophical problems; but estimation uncertainties arising 
from the difficulties of predicting the sources, amounts, and times of future tracking are large enough that they 
simply must be accounted for explicitly in any covariance forecasting methodology.  This latter requirement is in 
alignment with Kaplan’s dictum that statements of event likelihood are never single point-estimates but must be 
given as probability densities in order to represent the full range of possibilities given the uncertainties in the inputs. 
 A planned follow-on to this study will consider the additional covariance manipulation approach of scaling 
known covariances within bounded ranges to determine a maximum Pc value (a common practice to address 
relatively minor but known covariance realism deficiencies) and attempt to provide actual uncertainty 
methodologies and values to the covariance forecasting activity.  The hope is to provide a single, collected set of 
study results that examine all of the CA covariance manipulation approaches in the context of the Kaplan risk 
analysis foundational principles. 
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